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ANALISIS OF TITO BY THE ALLIED SECRET SERVICES

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careful study of the developments of the diplomatic action of Tito toward the West in its propagandistic reflections and of the "political penetration" of Eastern and Central Europe. In the last six months, the work has been particularly intensified, one of whose tasks being to monitor all of the broadcasts of Radio Belgrade and Radio Ljubljana in the Slovene, Serbo-croat, Italian and English languages in order to arrive at an up-to-date analysis of the progress of the tone, the volume and the limits of Tito's propaganda with regard to London and Washington, and indirectly with Rome and Vienna.

It is desired to know what proof of political conciliation the official Yugoslav propaganda has offered and is offering in connection with the economic-military conversations which have been in progress since July on the island of Brioni and in Belgrade and what direction this propaganda will take.

In the period from 1 February to 30 June 1948, that is, during the phase of "latent" and "initial" disagreement between the Cominform and Marshal Tito, which was still not known internationally, the two stations broadcast to Central Europe 555,750 words. Of these, 198,250 (36%) were devoted to foreign and internal political news without any commentary. This type of propagandistic material is classified by the technicians of the Monitoring Section under category 1.

At the same time, 217,560 words, or 39%, constituted direct propaganda against Washington and London, referred to as imperialists, fascists, war-mongers, etc. Along with this material there were another 56,500 words, or 10%, of indirect propaganda: "category three". These 56,500 words attacked the Allies for the support which they gave to the Italian recovery of Trieste, to the Austrian rights with respect to Carinthia, and for their attitude toward the U.S.S.R., "teacher and fatherland of socialism", etc. Only 83,440 words, 15%, were devoted to insignificant cultural, economic, and sports news - category four.

It is very significant - according to the experts of the Monitoring Section - that in the six months following the Tito "rupture" with Moscow, 54% of the words broadcast by the Belgrade and Ljubljana stations were devoted to domestic and foreign occurences without any compromising commentary either in favor of Russia or the Anglo-Americans. A clear increase in insignificant news compared with the previous six months was noted. Tito did not wish to compromise himself yet.

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But along with the uncompromising 54% and the balance between the two blocks, there were 160,090 words, or 26%, of direct propaganda against the Western powers, which indicates a certain concillating orientation in the so-called "category two" (propaganda) with respect to the period February-June 1948, during which said category reached a percentage of 39. "Category three" or indirect propaganda amounted to only 4%, and "category four" in turn had 11% (or) 99,790 words.

What is the current orientation of Yugoslav propaganda? According to the figures corresponding to the period 1 January 1949 to 30 June 1949, the statistical analysis though not definitive and official, produced the following information: Direct anti-Allied propaganda decreased to 12% with 70,000 words, while indirect propaganda increased, reaching its peak during the elections in Trieste and the conversations of the Four Powers held in Paris on the peace treaty with Austria.

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The analytical deduction states that the new attitude of Tito is to make a distinction between Washington and London as future protectors of Belgrade with respect to the Kremlin (on the one hand), and as participants on the side of Vienna and Rome in different problems (on the other). Tito's maneuver is very clever and intelligent, since it does not exclude the possibility of deals, but rather favors them in a conciliatory propagandistic climate. But he leaves firmly established (the idea) that he deals with the two important Atlantic capitals and not with the whole (Atlantic) community. This attitude justifies a series of broadcasts against the Atlantic pact.

In sum, Tito wants the friendship of the United States and Great Britain, but he tries, at the same time, to weaken the support which they give to the undeniable Austrian and Italian rights. But if Washington and London, as they have repeatedly attested, are firm in their present attitude, it can be assured that

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in the second half of this difficult year 1949 a drop also in the "indirect propaganda" coincidental with a substantial rapprochement by Belgrade with both Vienna and Rome.

M.B. (Initials at end of article)

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